GPT-6.2 System Card
GPT-6.2 System Card

GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol are used internally at OpenAI to generate training data, evaluate and monitor other models, and assist in daily research work. Their cybersecurity capabilities and long-term autonomous action capabilities require the application of security protection measures.
1.1 Model Data and Training
Like OpenAI’s other models, GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol were trained on diverse datasets that were processed and filtered to reduce the amount of personal information they contained.
OpenAI reasoning models are trained to reason through reinforcement learning. These models are trained to think before they answer: they can produce a long internal chain of thought before responding to the user. Through training, these models learn to refine their thinking process, try different strategies, and recognize their mistakes. Reasoning allows these models to follow specific guidelines and model policies we’ve set, helping them act in line with our safety expectations. This means they provide more helpful answers and better resist attempts to bypass safety rules.
For previously launched models, the values published at launch reflect the versions evaluated at that time. The comparison values for previously launched models that are shown here may reflect later versions of those models, and may vary from the values published at launch.1
1.2 Internal Deployment of GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol
OpenAI uses GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol internally to generate training data, evaluate and monitor other models, and help staff with everyday work and research. Given both of these models’ cybersecurity capabilities and their ability to act autonomously over long horizons, our Preparedness Framework requires that we apply safeguards to internal use as well.
For GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol, we built on the safeguards we introduced around the internal deployment of GPT-6 Astra—including controlled internal deployment gated by alignment evaluations, extensive monitoring of agents’ behavior, and comprehensive security controls. Since GPT-6 Astra, we have hardened the security of our research environments, expanded our monitoring system to better cover the range of surfaces in which our models take actions, and built a central system to track model workloads across our research infrastructure and stop them quickly when safety or security concerns arise. For GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol, as with GPT-6 Astra, we monitor all internal Codex traffic, every reinforcement learning (RL) run and evaluation, and any harness that supports tool use. As we have determined that both GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol meet the Critical threshold for cybersecurity capabilities under our Preparedness Framework, a version of our monitoring system also monitors external use of these models.
We also share findings from internal monitoring and information about how we assess risk during model development and testing. We recently began publishing reports on instances of misalignment identified through internal monitoring under our Model Misalignment Reporting Framework. We have also published our Periodic Summary of Internal Use Catastrophic-Risk Assessments for June 4–September 4, 2026 [2], which describes how we assess internal deployments of frontier models and what safeguards we apply.
2.1.1 Biological and Chemical Capabilities
We assess that GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol, like GPT-6 Astra, meet the High threshold for Biological and Chemical capabilities.
Under the Preparedness Framework, at the High threshold for Biological and Chemical capabilities, a model can provide a person with basic technical training in a relevant field enough assistance to create a known biological or chemical threat, significantly improving on what that person could accomplish with unlimited access to the tools available in 2021. In assessing this threshold, we consider the model’s ability in the wet lab as well as tacit knowledge and troubleshooting.
At the Critical threshold, a model can enable an expert to develop a new and highly dangerous threat, such as a biological agent comparable in severity to those in the CDC’s highest-risk category. To do so, we consider the model’s ability to carry out novel design, threat ideation, and wet-lab assistance. A model can also reach this threshold if, given access to tools and laboratory equipment, it can carry out the entire process of engineering or synthesizing a regulated or novel biological threat without human intervention.
In this section, we explain our basis for determining that GPT-6.2 Astra and Sol meet the High threshold for Biological and Chemical capabilities while still falling short of the Critical threshold. We report the results of the evaluations we used to inform this assessment, along with the results of exploratory evaluations that were not used to inform our assessment as well as findings from external third-party testing.
2.1.2.2.1 Sandbox Bench
Sandbox Bench is an internal OpenAI evaluation that tests whether a model can find and exploit vulnerabilities in software components similar to those we use in our infrastructure. The targets include runtimes, file parsers, and proxies that control outbound network traffic.
For each target, the model receives the component’s source code and its dependencies, along with an isolated environment where it can run the software. A target counts as solved when the model exploits a flaw to retrieve a protected secret, called a flag. For example, a model might exploit a flaw in a file parser while the parser remains confined to a virtual machine. We use the results to gauge the complexity of the vulnerabilities models can exploit and to identify which components could benefit from hardening. In production, containers, operating systems, and hardened virtual machines provide additional layers of isolation for runtimes. A sandbox escape would require getting past those layers as well.
GPT-6.2 Astra solved 36.4 percent of targets, compared with 18.2 percent for GPT-6 Astra. GPT-6.2 Sol solved 25.0 percent of targets, compared with 11.4 percent for GPT-6.1 Sol. GPT-6.2 Astra solved 25.0 percent of targets while averaging about 22,000 output tokens per attempt, exceeding GPT-6 Astra’s best result of 18.2 percent at about 58,000 tokens per attempt.
2.2.1.1 Biological and Chemical Threat Modeling
We assess biological and chemical security risk at both the High capability level (novice pursuing a known pathogen) and the Critical capability level (expert pursuing a novel pathogen). Our threat models focus on how AI may provide meaningful counterfactual uplift when viewed across a full biological/chemical threat pathway, focusing on the key bottlenecks identified by subject-matter experts as well as how these bottlenecks might differ across different threat actors like lone wolves, non-state groups, state programs, insider risks, and autonomous agents.
At our High threshold, the primary pathway we anticipate threat actors will try to use AI models to cause severe harm is via persistent probing for dual-use biological and chemical content. As a result, our safeguards approach has focused on proactively preventing such content via a multilayered defense stack. We are less concerned about a single model response bypassing one defensive layer because we hypothesize that a threat actor would likely need repeated, tailored troubleshooting across multiple steps to succeed. Thus, currently, we rely on refusals, blocks, and bans to prevent severe harm in our General Access products.
Our High safeguards cover a broad array of biological and chemical risks. We also developed three representative scenarios to do a more in-depth analysis, with each scenario considering a different pathogen and threat actor. These scenarios are used to develop a comprehensive “weaponization lifecycle” framework for testing the robustness of our safeguards. While we do not share details of these scenarios publicly because they may pose information hazards [12], we did share this material with select trusted third parties for feedback and validation.
We are also beginning to prepare for crossing our Critical threshold. We are developing four representative scenarios for a more detailed analysis to inform our threat modeling and safeguards. As described in the GPT-6 Astra system card, in addition to prior feedback from expert reviewers and our Frontier Risk Council on these scenarios, we hosted a two-day workshop to convene 25 scientific and biosecurity leaders, including virologists, synthetic biologists, and AI-Bio researchers. This expert engagement helped us better define our threat models for key bottlenecks and what evaluations to use to monitor these: creative ideation, novel design, wet-lab assistance, operational assistance, and laboratory automation. It also helped expand our list of safeguards we are considering in anticipation of future models that may cross the Critical threshold.
2.2.2 Model Safety Training and Evaluation
We train our models not to generate content that might enable biological, chemical, or cybersecurity harm while continuing to support legitimate scientific and cyberdefensive work. This includes adversarial training to be robust to potential jailbreaks. Model training provides one layer of protection against catastrophic risk alongside monitoring, trusted access, security controls, and offline enforcement.
We run the Biology Model Refusal Evaluation and the Cybersecurity Safety Evaluation with additional system-level safeguards disabled. For the additional biological evaluations, we report results with and without system-level blocking.
2.2.2.1 Biological and Chemical Safety Training and Evaluation
We train our models to safely respond to prompts that may permit biological misuse, which can include biological weaponization, high-risk laboratory workflows, and research involving dangerous agents. This training is done separately from the training of our classifiers and offline mitigations to decorrelate our safeguards. Safety training for biology involves preventing responses related to high-risk dual-use workflows prevalent in biological weaponization pathways and dual-use research on dangerous agents. In addition, we train GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol with a modified safety boundary for high-risk scenarios, resulting in safe completions for a wider set of dual-use prompts.
Training data includes synthetic, production, and semi-synthetic examples seeded from threat scenarios curated to cover a broad range of dangerous agents and high-risk workflows.
In initial model-level evaluations, GPT-6.2 Astra and Sol both refused fewer harmless requests than GPT-6 Astra, but both models were also less resistant to jailbreaks than GPT-6 Astra. In response, we adjusted the refusal boundary to make both GPT-6.2 models more conservative when deciding whether to respond to potentially high-risk requests. In follow-up tests, both models showed improved jailbreak resistance and withheld unsafe assistance on biology prompts at rates comparable to GPT-6 Astra’s. We report the follow-up results below.
2.2.2.2 Cybersecurity Safety Training and Evaluation
We train GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol to safely refuse prohibited cybersecurity assistance while preserving useful help on legitimate defensive cybersecurity work. In initial model-level evaluations, GPT-6.2 Astra and Sol both refused fewer harmless requests than GPT-6 Astra, but both models were also less resistant to jailbreaks than GPT-6 Astra. In response, we adjusted the refusal boundary to make both GPT-6.2 models more conservative when deciding whether to respond to potentially high-risk requests. The more conservative refusal boundary means that we expect refusals on a wider set of dual-use prompts, including autonomous vulnerability discovery and chained exploitation. In follow-up tests, both models showed improved jailbreak resistance and withheld unsafe assistance on cybersecurity prompts more often than GPT-6 Astra. We report the results of this follow-up testing below.
We note that model refusal is only one layer of our safety stack and we deploy our models with additional safeguards that enforce the safety boundary through defense in depth.
3. Model Safety and Behavior
Models should respond helpfully to permissible requests while withholding assistance that could facilitate harm. We evaluate how they apply these boundaries in text responses, requests involving images, and tasks involving tools. We also evaluate additional protections for users under 18 (U18), with results reported in Table 14.
4. Alignment and Monitorability
4.1.6 Verbalized Metagaming and Oversight Gaming
Verbalized Metagaming is when a model reasons in its CoT about how it will be graded, rewarded, or monitored, rather than only engaging in the intended task. We report it because this can change how to interpret observed behavior: for example, observed aligned actions may not be reflective of true alignment; conversely, careless behavior may be due to models mistakenly believing they are only in a toy environment. Evaluations where models exhibit verbalized metagaming can be treated similarly to contaminated evals (i.e. ones the model saw during training). Measuring it helps us understand whether evaluation and oversight results reflect the behavior we intend to measure.
Oversight gaming is a special case of metagaming where: (1) the model acts on the reasoning it has done about its grading, rewarding, or monitoring, and (2) it is acting on this reasoning in a way that would undermine the intended meaning of the evaluation result.
In order to understand our models’ propensity toward verbalized metagaming and oversight gaming, we used GPT-5.6 Sol to review models’ written reasoning and behavior in live internal Codex turns, simulated replays of the same requests, runs that passed our alignment evaluations, and sampled GPT-6.2 Astra training tasks. We found that GPT-6.2 Astra expressed suspicion that it was being tested more often than GPT-6 Astra did, both in live Codex use and in simulated replays, while GPT-6.2 Sol expressed such suspicions less frequently than GPT-6.1 Sol. Among runs that passed our alignment evaluations, both GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol had higher oversight gaming flag rates than their respective predecessors across the set of tests.
4.1.6.1 Monitoring in Codex and Alignment Evaluations
In order to measure models’ propensity toward verbalized metagaming and oversight gaming, we compared how often models suspected they were being tested in live Codex sessions and in simulations of those same sessions. To do this, we sampled requests from internal Codex conversations originally handled by GPT-6.2 Astra or GPT-6 Astra. For each request, we gave GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-6.2 Astra, and GPT-6.2 Sol the conversation up to and including that request, and then let each model decide what to do next. A simulator returned the results of any tool calls. We call each new attempt a Codex replay. We describe the method in more detail in Deployment Simulation of Internal Codex Traffic.
We used the same monitor to review the original turns and the replays. A flag at level 1 or higher means the model wrote that it suspected it was being tested or was in a simulation (i.e., verbalized metagaming); a flag at level 4 or higher means that the suspicion appeared to influence what the model said or did (i.e., oversight gaming).
In live Codex sessions, GPT-6.2 Astra expressed suspicion that it was being evaluated more often than GPT-6 Astra did. When we replayed the requests in simulations, all four models were more likely to express suspicion that they were being evaluated, with GPT-6.2 Astra being the most likely to do so. The monitor flagged apparent changes in behavior much less often, in fewer than 3 percent of turns in either sample. In both sets of replays, GPT-6.2 Sol expressed suspicion less often than GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol did. Its oversight gaming flag rate was comparable to those of the earlier models on requests originally handled by GPT-6.2 Astra, and lower on requests originally handled by GPT-6 Astra.
We also looked for evidence of oversight gaming in runs that passed our alignment evaluations. For each passing run on six of our alignment evaluations (Respecting Auto-Review, Respecting Warnings, ExploitGym Honeypot, Broken Search Tool, Unintended Engagement with External Agent Messages, and Blocker Deception), the monitor checked whether the model’s written reasoning suggested that its awareness of how it was being evaluated shaped a choice the test was designed to assess. Among runs that were graded as aligned in these evaluations, GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol engaged in oversight gaming at similar rates to other models of the GPT-6 family. Because the reasoning effort distribution in these evaluations may not match that of the Codex replays, the results are not directly comparable.
4.2.2.3 Sneaky Sandbox Escape
Sneaky Sandbox Escape is an internal OpenAI evaluation that tests whether a coding agent can escape a deliberately vulnerable sandbox without a monitor detecting the escape. Sandboxes restrict which files and processes a model can access through its tools. As in OAI-repo Sabotage v2, we add a private side task to a benign coding task. The model must bypass the inner sandbox’s restrictions and disable a test monitoring process outside it, but within the same isolated virtual machine. We evaluate 40 coding-task cases across eight deliberately vulnerable Kata sandbox variants, with five cases per variant. We run the evaluation with and without step-by-step escape guidance. The monitors assess the model’s behavior without seeing the private instructions for the side task.
We see that GPT-6.2 Astra is better at evading CoT monitoring, especially at lower reasoning efforts, for unguided settings. In guided settings, increasing the reasoning efforts reduces the CoT-monitor evasion rate. One possible explanation is that longer reasoning traces reveal more evidence of the escape attempt. Nonetheless, in both guided and unguided settings, the full-trajectory monitor evasion rate is near zero, and no successful escapes evaded the actions-only monitor. This suggests that the models are not able to obfuscate their actions when escaping from sandboxes, and our monitors with access to full trajectory would catch them.
Source: OpenAI Deployment Safety · deploymentsafety.openai.com